President Dwight D. Eisenhower was profoundly ambivalent about the Supreme Court's decision in  to declare segregation unconstitutional, but was ultimately constrained to use federal forces to apply the law of the land and to assert the authority of the federal government in Little Rock.
 Eisenhower's ambivalence in  was not singular.

Although the issues embedded in the Little Rock crisis revealed it to be a chapter of an intrinsically American epic, this paper will explore some other dimensions of the crisis that would suggest that its importance transcended American history even as it ultimately helped to reshape American domestic politics. This study of the Little Rock episode will suggest that the crisis achieved a global significance by provoking a wider debate about the ethic of "white supremacy" that underlay segregation in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, and the colonial order in the non-European world. Further, this essay argues that the Little Rock crisis served as a catalyst for a major shift in the course of American engagement with the world outside of Europe. This is an aspect of the crisis that has hitherto received little attention. Among the consequences of the crisis for the United States was the opening of American domestic politics and race relations to international scrutiny and criticism. As a result, international opinion increasingly became a constituency with which American policymakers had to contend when responding to the challenge of racial reform in the United States. In effect, it is possible to argue that the crisis in Arkansas helps us to rethink assumptions about the relationship between "national" and "international" history and allows students of American history to explore the international sources of change in American society and politics.  . In a letter to Swede Hazlett, his boyhood friend, Eisenhower confided that "no other single event has so disturbed the domestic scene in many years as did the Supreme Court's decision of  in the school segregation case. That decision and similar ones earlier and later in point of time have interpreted the Constitution in such fashion as to put heavier responsibilities than before on the Federal government in the matter of assuring to each citizen his guaranteed Constitutional rights." For the full text of the letter see Robert Griffith, Ike's Letters to a Friend (Lawrence, KS, ), -.
. In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that since boyhood "I had accepted without qualification the right to equality before the law of all citizens of this country, whatever their race or color or creed." See Waging Peace, - (New York, ), ; but at a more visceral level, Eisenhower's views revealed the fear of racial mixing that has informed the American weltanschauung. He confided to Earl Warren that he sympathized with Southerners whose concern "is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes." Quoted in Stanley I. Kutler, "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation: Some Reflections," in As its title suggests, the essay draws upon the observation made at the turn of the century by W. E. B. Du Bois: "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, -the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea."
 The genius of that insight was Du Bois's recognition that the politics of race in the United States could not be divorced from the fate of non-European societies that had come under the yoke of European and American imperial authority.
 The Little Rock crisis was testimony to Du Bois's perspicacity and helps us to understand how the politics of race in the United States was an issue that was simultaneously domestic and international.

The Little Rock crisis was not the first occasion on which there had been untoward foreign policy consequences as a result of the politics of race and segregation in the United States. In the autumn of , several New York hotels had refused to accommodate the UN delegations of Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia. As a result, the American Mission to the United Nations had been constrained to intervene to secure accommodation for these delegations and had also sought to prevent this situation from being publicized.
 It was evident that the presence of African and other black diplomats, with the privileges associated with diplomatic life, had begun to complicate American domestic politics. As a consequence, the potentially embarrassing consequences of segregation was the sword of Damocles that hung over American pretensions to world leadership after , and the establishment of the headquarters of the United Nations in New York City ensured that the problem would never really leave. While the Secretary-General of the UN and the US Mission to the UN . W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Souls of Black Folk," in  Negro Classics, intro. by John Hope Franklin (New York, ), .
. The intersection of domestic and foreign policy on issues of race has been a consistent theme in the political activism of African Americans. For accounts of the consistency of this theme in African-American history see Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W. E 
. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American
were able to intervene to resolve the problem in , the issue remained a festering sore for American diplomacy.

The issue of American race relations, however, was not purely of domestic concern. Despite the relative success in keeping control over the publication of incidents involving foreign dignitaries of color, the State Department had a much more difficult time with a less sympathetic international press and the foreign coverage of racial problems in the United States. In October , the American Embassy in France reported widespread condemnation of the verdict in the Emmett Till case. An all-white jury in Mississippi had acquitted the accused murderers of Till, a teenager from Chicago who had been killed as a result of his decision to solicit the attention of a white woman with whom he wasnot acquainted. According to the embassy, the French press "gave wide coverage to the Till case, vociferously condemning the verdict. This was true not only of l'Humanite and Liberation, but of the entire press, right wing and left wing alike."
 The embassy in Bern reported that the Swiss press had expressed similar views about the decision.

In early , the American Embassy in Copenhagen reported that the case of Autherine Lucy, a young African-American woman seeking admission into the University of Alabama, was enjoying sympathetic coverage in the Danish press.  The embassy indicated that the administration and students of the two Danish universities (Copenhagen and Aarhus), with support from a local paper, had telegraphed their support and sympathy to Miss Lucy. In addition, the Danish Association for the United Nations and the liberal anti-communist League for Tolerance had decided to send a joint telegram to Miss Lucy expressing their sympathy with "[her] efforts for the observance of human rights and civilization at the University of Alabama."
 The president of the League for Tolerance and the rector of the University of Copenhagen later telegraphed an offer to register Miss Lucy as a student at the University of Copenhagen and assured her of financial assistance to complete her studies. The American official's report continued with an assessment of the damage being done to American prestige "from such tragedies as the Emmett Till case and the unfortunate riots attending Miss Lucy's efforts." He criticized the American press for contributing to the situation and noted that "intensified efforts of the U.S. press and Government to give a balanced picture in reasonable perspective will of course help."
Even as the embassy in Copenhagen agonized over the damage done to American "prestige" by the confrontations over segregation, the reaction from the State Department was instructive of the mind-set shaping American foreign policy. Responding to press reports on  February of the offer to Miss Lucy from the University of Copenhagen and the Danish League for Tolerance, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally contacted the embassy indicating that "information available here identifies League as independent antiCommunist group. Dept regards matter as private non-governmental affair and plans make no comment. President University Alabama informed foregoing."

It was obvious that Dulles saw little need to be concerned about foreign criticism of American race relations.

Despite the administration's sanguine disregard for Danish sentiment, the concerns over American racial problems were not restricted to Europeans. The American consul general in Bombay reported that in the local press there was extensive coverage of American race relations in both the North and the South. The consul general advised that "racial discrimination and racial prejudice as shown in the treatment of Negroes in the United States will probably long continue to be an important adverse factor in the attitude of the Indian people toward the United States."
 The American consul in Calcutta reported that press coverage there had also been extensive and critical of developments in the United States. One example of these critical views was an editorial carried by the Hindusthan Standard that pointedly argued that support of white supremacist ideas did little to strengthen American claims to be a champion of democracy.
 The Indian coverage of American politics was also influenced by the Montgomery bus boycott and its adoption of Mohandas Gandhi's strategy of passive resistance that had been used to telling effect in bringing an end to the British Raj. One Indian correspondent filing a story from New York for the continue their avid interest and frequently to misread or exaggerate various incidents to the detriment of U.S. prestige and reputation."
. Dulles tel. to American Embassy, Copenhagen,  February , RG , . /-. . Eisenhower himself seemed to display very little concern about the actions of state and university authorities in Alabama. In a response to letters from citizens writing Eisenhower about the incident, Maxwell Rabb, the administration's troubleshooter on issues of race, advised that the president had expressed his regret about the incident and his hope that "the State and the University would be able to find a solution." Since  was a presidential election year, it is not impossible that Eisenhower sought to avoid any action that would antagonize Southern white voters and states rights' advocates on the matter of segregation. In the same letter, Rabb expressed the view that "the problem at the University of Alabama is not within the jurisdiction of the federal government and it is indicated that federal intervention in what is essentially a matter of State concern would undoubtedly be interpreted as a violation of the constitutional rights of the individual States." Maxwell M. Rabb to James A. Haljun,  February , Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alphabetical File, box , Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
. Turner despatch to the Department of State,  February , RG , . /-. . Van Hollen depatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , . /-. The editorial concluded that the "inhumanity of racial arrogance seems to have become the privilege of certain people with blonde skins. The odd thing is that it finds apologists among U.S. leaders who want to convert pigmented Asians to the American cult of democracy."
Hindu newspaper in Madras, expressed the view that "the bus boycott may well turn out to be an epochal event in the history of the Southern Negro. If it succeeds, it is bound to be copied by other Negroes all over the south where the Whites are fighting a last-ditch battle to preserve segregation of the races."

In hindsight, it would appear that the Indian correspondent's insight into the significance of the Montgomery boycott for the future of American race relations was prescient.
The foreign coverage critical of American race relations was exacerbated by the activities of expatriates like Josephine Baker, the American performer who had built a considerable reputation in Europe as both a performance artist and a political activist. The American embassy in Stocholm reported that Baker had lectured to several audiences in the capital during February and March . On  March she was the featured speaker at a charity benefit organized by the Stockholm branch of the Social Democratic Party where the audience of five thousand people included the prime minister and his wife. The minister of defense introduced Baker, who spoke about developments in the United States and described the current situation as "as bad as it has ever been."  Baker's speech provided grist for the ongoing debate among Swedish newspapers about the racial situation in the United States. The embassy reported that Swedish coverage of American race relations was both extensive and critical of the meager record of racial reform.

The reasons for the "unspectacular record of accomplishment" was well illustrated by an internal debate over American policy toward South Africa in . After a trip to Africa in , Mason Sears, who was the American representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, forwarded a report on his visit to the State Department. Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, sent a letter to Dulles expressing his view that "Mason Sears may have irritated a few hard-shelled colonialists (although he is on good terms with the actual administrators), but he has certainly made a lot of friends for us with the natives, who have the future in front of them and where it means something to the United States for the long pull."
 As would become evident, Sears's report was also to be an irritant to the State Department. Sears's first recommendation was to suggest that the Fourth of July celebrations hosted by American embassies and consulates in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya should be opened to Africans. He justified his suggestion by arguing that it was unseemly to pander to the racism of white settlers when celebrating American independence.
 He further argued that that the inclusion of Africans at these ceremonies would generate considerable goodwill for the United States in the rest of Africa. Sears was not simply content to make this recommendation and went on to advise that "this is a matter which should not be left to the discretion of our own representatives on the spot. It should come as a clear and specific order from the Secretary of State, especially considering the recent disgraceful race riots in Alabama. It would please many citizens of the United States, and a careful program should be worked out to see to it that American opinion be informed of this decision."

The secretary of state, however, was not inclined to agree with the role assigned to him or with the arguments advanced for the policy change recommended by Sears. Lodge again raised the issue with Dulles in late March, and Dulles in his response on  April stated his agreement with the principle that invitations should not be discriminatory either at home or abroad, but cautioned that American representatives abroad should be attentive to local conditions.  Despite Dulles's reluctance to endorse Sears's approach, Sears decided to pursue the matter. In June, he visited the State Department in Washington to discuss his recommendation with members of the office dealing with Southern African affairs. There, Sears indicated that the "unencouraging reply" that he had received from the secretary notwithstanding, he still saw merit in the proposal. He reiterated his view that the "inclusion of non-whites at these receptions would have a strikingly beneficial effect upon the attitude of nonWhites throughout Africa towards the U.S."
 He also stated his view that while such a policy shift would antagonize the Afrikaners, it would not have a deleterious effect upon U.S.-South African relations.
As Sears was to discover, his views ran counter to the consensus in the Department of State. The departmental officers with whom he met sought to discourage Sears from further advocacy of his proposal. The desk officers advised Sears that his recommendation would require a complete policy review including consideration of issues of defense and the supply of strategic minerals. They expressed the view that his proposal would poison U.S.-South African relations without "any significant compensatory benefit" and that U.S. policy was to support "stability and orderly development in South Africa, including, whenever possible and practicable, the persuasion of responsible South African whites to moderate their restrictive policies."
 Sears was informed that the Egyptian charge d'affaires, who was himself dark-skinned, did not invite Africans to Egypt's national day celebrations. Further, the Soviets had been asked to leave South Africa after they had invited non-whites to their national day reception, and the Indian representative had been expelled for "destructive" contacts with non-white leaders. According to the officers, "American officials had gone as far as possible, further than most, in developing contacts with non-whites. . . . By way of example, when Bishop Jordan, an American Negro Bishop of the AME (African Methodist Episcopal) Church, was a visitor to South Africa in , Ambassador E. T. Wailes invited Bishop Jordan and his wife to his residence for tea and included as his guests two South African non-white clergymen who were also members of the AME Church in the Union."
 In addition, there was concern that inviting non-whites to the Fourth of July celebrations would lead to a South African government response that would effectively restrict the embassy's ability to maintain contacts with nonwhites. Thus, practicing segregation in South Africa was seen as essential to maintaining good relations with the apartheid regime and providing access to the colored communities of the country. Sears was also informed that South Africa's recent efforts to promote friendly relations with all African territories and willingness to recognize both the Sudan and Ghana suggested that the "Afrikaner was not so inflexible as sometimes labeled."
 The presentation by the State Department's officers was so persuasive that Sears called the next day to inform Assistant Secretary of State Francis Wilcox that he was abandoning his proposal and his efforts to see Dulles about the issue.

This episode demonstrated the Eisenhower administration's sensitivity to the concerns of the white minority government in South Africa. American sympathy for the South African apartheid regime continued even as apartheid came under increasing criticism in the wider international community. In , apartheid had been dropped from the agenda of the United Nations after a Costa Rican resolution to have the United Nations General Assembly consider the issue had failed to secure the vote of two-thirds of the members.
 The United States had supported the effort to block continued UN consideration and debate of apartheid, though it had carefully sought to avoid playing a leadership role in the negotiations to remove apartheid from the UN agenda.
. Memorandum of conversation between Sears and Dumont,  June , RG , . /-. Sears conceded that his previous proposal would be detrimental to American national interests.
. Acting director of the Office of Southern Africa Affairs (Hadsel) to the ambassador in Egypt (Byroade),  August , FRUS, -  :-.
One reason for that avoidance of leadership on the issue was the fear that adopting "such a position might place us in an unfavorable light and leave us vulnerable to charges that we were taking the position because of racial conditions" at home.
 This awareness of the political liability that South Africa posed for American foreign policy was recognized and articulated very clearly to the ambassador-designate to South Africa in August . He was advised that: "South Africa is one of the West's greatest propaganda liabilities because of its restrictive racial policy directed at all non-whites.The voting on South African issues before the UN can cause the U.S. to be identified with colonialism and the maintenance of apartheid."
 The sense of shared interests between South Africa and the United States -founded upon their common embrace of white supremacy -was further strengthened by the deepening strategic and economic ties between the two countries.
 Segregation, investment, and security formed the tripod upon which "congenial" U.S.-South African relations were mounted.
The Sears démarche had not occasioned any significant departure in the fundamental tenets of American policy toward South Africa. It had, however, sparked a discussion about the domestic ramifications of American policy toward South Africa. Lodge, in his letter of  February to Dulles, had expressed concerns about the domestic political repercussions of the segregated celebrations described by Sears. Lodge suggested that the Democrats "would certainly jump on the Fourth of July business if they knew about it. Per contra, we could get some credit at home if we ended this practice."  Lodge's comments may have reflected sensitivities to the fact that  was an election year. With competition for the black vote likely to be part of any electoral campaign, he was undoubtedly seeking to ensure that the Republicans could gain some public . Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, New York,  October , ibid., -.
. "U.S. Policy toward South Africa," enclosure in Hadsel to Byroade,  August , ibid., -.
. Hadsel to Byroade,  August , ibid., -. The reasons for the identification of American interests with that of the apartheid regime were clearly articulated to the ambassadordesignate. "From a practical point of view, our relations with South Africa are very friendly and harmonious. South Africa is strongly anti-Communist and pro-West. It looks increasingly to the United States, instead of Britain as formerly, as its model, its leader, and its source of assistance and capital. There is more American capital invested in South Africa today than in any other African territory -over $,,.  American companies are represented there, and there are several thousand Americans resident throughout the Union. South Africans of all races are so friendly and hospitable by nature that Americans find life in the Union usually congenial." This harmony was further buttressed by an American assistance program for the extraction of uranium and its reliance upon South Africa for such other strategic minerals as manganese and chrome. In addition, the two countries were working upon a Nuclear Reactor Treaty and improvement of the South African early-warning radar system with help from the U.S. Air Force.
. A section of Lodge's letter is reprinted as a footnote to Sears's memorandum.  February , FRUS, -  :.
relations benefits while denying the Democrats an issue for the presidential campaign.

This Republican sensitivity to the implications of foreign policy for domestic politics was not restricted to Lodge. In February , the New York Times carried an item reporting that the former ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, had expressed his view to Paul Hoffman, a liberal Republican, that the American position in Asia was deteriorating consistently and was losing ground to the Communists. He advocated greater involvement of Democrats in shaping foreign policy to ensure that the Eisenhower administration pursued a genuinely bipartisan foreign policy in order to reverse the situation.
 In a letter dated  February  to the Times, Bernard Katzen, a consultant to the Republican National Committee, responded to Bowles. He welcomed the proposal for a bipartisan foreign policy and expressed the view that "Mr. Bowles' proposal is not an unmixed blessing as long as the Democratic party is dominated by an element which adheres to a policy of white supremacy."

Katzen added that the memories of Western domination and oppression in Asia were a critical factor spurring the growth of Communist influence.
 Citing the dominance of the Southern wing of the Democratic party in Congress, Katzen argued that Democratic participation in shaping American foreign policy would not demonstrate an American commitment to self-determination, the equality of all races, creeds, and colors, or a willingness to deal with the peoples of Asia and Africa "out of respect and not out of sufferance."
 The frankness of the debate and Katzen's invocation of the bigotry that permeated Southern political life to stigmatize the Democrats reflected the growing sensitivity to the issue of race in American politics after the Brown decision.
The debate over the appropriate American foreign policy strategy in dealing with Asia was occurring in an international context electrified by the decision of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan to sponsor a conference of Afro-Asian states at Bandung, Indonesia, in early . As preparations for the conference progressed, the State Department and John Foster Dulles became . Lodge, from his position at the United Nations, continued to serve as an adviser to Eisenhower on domestic politics, and this may help to explain in part the administration's increasing sensitivity to the issue of race on both American domestic politics and foreign policy. . Letter to the editor, The New York Times,  February . . Ibid. According to Katzen, "It is these memories of past grievances and wounded pride, because of the color line, which are mainly responsible for the aloofness of the peoples of Asia and Africa to the Western democracies."
. Ibid.
increasingly aware of the unsettling implications of the conference for Western pre-eminence in the international system.  The situation was made worse by the decision of Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., to attend the Bandung Conference despite opposition from the Eisenhower administration. At the meeting itself, it was left to Powell to defend the American record on race relations and endorse the strategy of gradual racial reform that had begun.
 Powell's presence at Bandung, and the predicament it represented for the Eisenhower administration, symbolized the complications that race in American domestic policy posed for the administration's efforts to position the United States as a world leader. Bandung and Powell represented the assertiveness of people of color both inside and outside of the United States and the growing challenge to white supremacy in both international and domestic terms. Inevitably, the actions of the world of color outside of the United States had implications for American domestic politics, a reality underscored by the conference at Bandung.
This sensitivity to non-European views of the direction of American foreign policy had been displayed by John Foster Dulles as early as .
 The concern among people of the Third World about the American agenda was addressed in an even more direct fashion by Vice President Nixon. The latter had made a tour of several African countries in early  and had attended the independence celebrations of Ghana during that tour. In his report to President Eisenhower, submitted before the Little Rock crisis, Nixon wrote: "We cannot In his autobiography, Powell remembered his trip to Bandung as a transformative experience that led him to become more militant in his espousal of the civil rights agenda within the United States. At the time, he was castigated by many in the black community while endearing himself to influential whites and the Eisenhower administration.
. Radio address by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, secretary of state, on his recent trip to the Near East and South Asia,  June , FO /, Public Record Office, Kew, United Kingdom. In his address, Dulles commented on the fact that "most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies."
talk equality to the peoples of Africa and Asia and practice inequality in the United States. In the national interest, as well as for the moral issues involved, we must support the necessary steps which will assure orderly progress towards the elimination of discrimination in the United States."
 Thus, for Nixon, Dulles, Lodge, and other American policymakers, it was evident that the legal architecture of segregation and its implication of white supremacy in the United States were significant impediments to the credibility of the United States as it sought to extend its influence into the non-European world.
The State Department's willingness to defend South Africa did not imply that the American government was hostile to the idea that a transition from colonial rule was imminent by the mid-s. One of the early strategies suggested for dealing with the changing African situation was for the United States to adopt a policy "supporting a multi-racial approach to the problems of Africa South of the Sahara. Any other course of action would, in the long run, meet with such domestic opposition within the United States that it would be next to impossible to carry out."
 American support for multiracialism in Africa was born of the declining legitimacy of white supremacist ideology in American domestic politics. At one level, it was a reflection of the sustained interest of African-American activists in African issues.
 At another level, support for aid to Africa could reconcile both domestic and foreign policy imperatives -aid could be used as a mechanism for extending American influence in Africa and accommodating African-American sentiment on an issue of great sensitivity.

In the years leading up to the Little Rock crisis, American segregationist practices and assumptions of white supremacy had come under question from both its allies and enemies in Europe and from the increasingly assertive non-European world. The foreign criticism stimulated the growing recognition of the fact that American domestic politics had become a foreign policy issue . This sense of the increasing importance of Africa to American politics and foreign policy was evidenced in a State Department memorandum in December . Arguing the case for the extension of American technical assistance to European colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, the memorandum suggested that "If we do not gradually ease into the picture there, a rising nationalistic sentiment among the peoples south of the Sahara will look elsewhere for help and sympathy. It is a most fertile field for future (and not so distant future) Soviet activity. Moreover, American Negroes are beginning to look on Africa south of the Sahara with somewhat the same kind of sympathy and interest as American Zionists look on Israel. We should capitalize on this sentiment, utilizing it to work towards evolution rather than revolution in Africa. American Negroes, who are our best hope of keeping Africa oriented towards the United States, are anxious for the Department to help in the improvement of economic conditions in Africa and would be very much upset by a decision against any technical assistance programs there." See assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs (Allen) memorandum to the secretary of state,  December , FRUS, -  :.
in an era of increasing American involvement with, and attempts to influence, the international system. Moreover, the growing sensitivity to issues of race promoted a reconsideration of the importance of Africa to American politics and the views of African Americans in devising American foreign policy. In addition, the Suez crisis of  had revealed the widening rift between the Eisenhower administration and its European allies over the style and objectives of Western engagement with the non-European world. It was perhaps inevitable that, after the humiliation of Suez, European sentiment would tend to be unsympathetic to the Eisenhower administration's hubris on race. Having cast itself as more enlightened than its European partners on the issue of colonialism in dealing with Suez, the United States found itself challenged to display its progressive sentiment on race in its domestic politics. Little Rock had become the Suez of the Eisenhower administration -a moment of crisis that forced a fundamental and radical reassessment of existing approaches to dealing with the world of color. And like the European colonial powers after Suez, it would require several years and changes in existing leadership -the accession to office by Harold Macmillan in Britain, Charles de Gaulle in France, and John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in the United States -for the required changes to be implemented in the various countries.
Eisenhower sent troops to deal with the crisis in Little Rock with the full recognition that he needed to reassert the authority of the federal government against a challenge from a Southern governor who had insisted upon defying the authority of the federal courts on the volatile issue of desegregation. The decision to send troops into the South came barely two months after the president had publicly stated that he could not envisage the need to use troops to enforce the orders of federal courts.
 For Eisenhower, given his desire to court Southern whites as a key constituency in the  and  presidential elections and his own sympathy for their sensitivities on the issue of ending segregation, it was undoubtedly a wrenching decision. It was also probable that one of the reasons for his vacillation in his dealings with Governor Orval Faubus in Arkansas may have been the fear that sending military forces into the South, as the Republicans had done during Reconstruction, would cost his party dearly in the  election.  . Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, . . One of the interesting aspects of the workings of the Eisenhower White House was the care lavished upon ensuring that the administration did not appear to be solicitous of AfricanAmerican concerns. One perspective was provided by E. Frederic Morrow, the first black presidential assistant. As the racial tensions in the country mounted and the Little Rock crisis unfolded, Morrow lamented, "I have been powerless to do anything. The President's advisers have not asked me my thinking on these matters, and I am too well-schooled in protocol to advance any uninvited ideas." E. Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House (New York, ), -. Robert Burk was of the view that the White House was more interested in having black government employees "as symbols of national racial democracy rather than in their usefulness as policy makers." As a consequence, the resident troubleshooter on racial matters was Maxwell Rabb, a former volunteer assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge who was Jewish and "liberal." See Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, .
In spite of his own personal and political inclinations, Eisenhower's decision reflected the success of such advisers as Attorney General Herbert Brownell and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in persuading the president that the Little Rock crisis was a defining moment. According to Brownell, the administration had been preparing for a crisis on the scale of the one that developed in Little Rock. Thus, contingency planning had focused upon establishing the legal framework for presidential intervention in a crisis.
Dulles, for his part, had indicated in early September that the pictures of the confrontation in Little Rock had not been helpful to American foreign policy.
 Just hours before Eisenhower addressed the nation on radio and television about his decision to send troops, Dulles and Brownell discussed the "No, I ain't scared, but you gotta admit, this is a hell of a way to get a education!" crisis. Dulles reiterated his view that "this situation is ruining our foreign policy. The effect of this in Asia and Africa will be worse for us than Hungary was for the Russians."
 Brownell informed Dulles that Eisenhower had been given "the USIA report which mentioned the use Nasser and Khruschev were making of it. The President was very alert to this aspect."
 The international reaction to the crisis had become a factor weighing upon the administration's strategy for dealing with the crisis. Eisenhower's address explicitly recognized the international reaction: "it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world."
 The address was translated into forty-three languages and the details of the deployments were broadcast over the Voice of America. Eisenhower was acting to reassure foreign audiences that his administration was committed to enforcing the authority of the federal government, including the use of troops, to protect the rights of African Americans.
The increasing international attention to the desegregation struggle in the United States was not prompted solely by the international prominence of the United States and its conflict with the Soviet Union. The inherent advantages of a well-developed system for disseminating news internationally also contributed, as did European resentment of American behavior during the Suez crisis. Just as important was the fact that the developments in the United States awakened anxieties among the European states that were confronted by analogous problems in their colonies or in their own societies. The criticism of the United States that emerged often reflected the awareness that few Europeans or their descendants outside of Europe were able to cast the proverbial first stone on the issue of the treatment of minorities within Europe or people of color in the world outside of Europe. They were aware that the resolution of the problem of segregation in the United States would have enormous implications for their own ability to deal with the color line in their own societies or empires. Nazi Germany had demonstrated the ultimate logic of the ideology . Memorandum of a telephone conversation between the secretary of state and the attorney general (Brownell), Washington,  September , FRUS, -  (Washington, ), :-. In an earlier conversation on the same day with Senator William Knowland, the influential Republican from California, Dulles indicated that the situation made "him sick at heart" after Knowland had expressed the view that "if we can't counteract the Little Rock thing we will undo all the good will we have build [sic] of racial supremacy.
 The experience of the United States, which held the largest minority of color among the Western states, and its leadership role within the Western alliance had become a touchstone of the relationship between the white and colored worlds.
From Brussels, the American embassy reported that the press coverage of the racial situation in the United States betrayed resentment "of so-called American 'anti-colonialism' [and questioned] whether America's handling of its racial problem qualifies it to champion allegedly oppressed peoples living under colonial rule."
 The dispatch indicated that the Belgian response reflected concern about the situation in the Belgian Congo, where the record of the white colonists on race relations left a lot to be desired. Similarly, the embassy in Paris attributed the heightened emotional reaction to the verdict in the Emmett Till murder case to "the unfortunate timing of the event. The trial broke at a time when French sensitivities were aroused over foreign criticism of the French handling of the North African situation. [The acquittals] gave the French an opportunity, which was eagerly seized, to point to racial problems in the United States and to indulge in an outraged sense of indignation and innocence."
 The embassy in Auckland reported that concern about the parallels that could be drawn between the treatment of the Maori in New Zealand and blacks in the United Sates seemed to have motivated some of the harsh criticism directed at the United States.

Yet reaction to the American racial situation was not relatively uniform across all of the European imperial states. The American consul in Oporto reported that a commentator for one of the local newspapers, in his commentary on race relations in the United States, was much more sanguine about the history of Portuguese race relations. According to an editorial in Jornal de Noticias, " Fortunately, in our country racial prejudice does not exist; it is repudiated by our people, which in my opinion is one of the marks of the superiority of their character and intelligence."  Thus, for some the racial situation in the United States was a comforting reassurance of their own . The USIA reported from Bonn that while the Little Rock crisis had received extensive press coverage in Germany, there had been considerable restraint in commentary on the issue. The lack of criticism was attributed to "German awareness [ . The editorial continued: "In our universities no anti-racial measures have ever been considered. On the contrary, the colored man is treated with special affection. The negro among us enjoys popularity, as witness that of certain soccer players. Likewise in Brazil, where despite the large percentage of colored citizens, racial prejudice is nonexistent. On the contrary, the Brazilian is fully aware of the importance of the negro contribution to his civilization -the docility, simplicity and resigned courage in the face of the worse hardships, the obstinate sensuality -as pointed out by a favorite poet." Reed despatch to the Department of State,  March , RG , ./-.
exceptional enlightenment on the issues of race and their own imperial strategies. The lack of irony in the statement suggested the capacity for selfdeception by the imperial powers -even those representative of the European fascist impulse of the s.
Nonetheless, the Little Rock crisis, involving as it did the direct challenge to the authority of the federal government and the use of troops to resolve the confrontation, magnified both the stakes and the level of concern. The embassy in Brussels reported that Little Rock and segregation was receiving more press coverage than any previous American domestic issue. In addition to criticisms of American racial bigotry and the questioning of "the high moral attitude adopted by the United States in international affairs . . . many newspapers now seem to be much more concerned about the effects of Little Rock on American prestige in Asia and Africa than in Belgium."
 These concerns were echoed in Berne where the embassy reported that the "general reaction is one of sober dismay over display of such violence and resulting incalculable harm done to [the] occidental position throughout the non-European world." The Swiss concern also extended to the fact that Little Rock had occurred at the same time that the United Nations General Assembly was debating the Soviet-led invasion of Hungary in  and its aftermath.
 In effect, European commentary acknowledged that American foreign policy had been compromised by the crisis in Little Rock. In Luxembourg, the reaction was very similar to that of the Swiss. The Socialist Tageblatt editorialized that "Little Rock was a happy find for the Communists as a means of overshadowing the condemnation of the Hungarian massacre and the new Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union."
 From Amsterdam, the embassy reported that the Little Rock crisis was seen as "unbecoming of a nation which continually affirms its devotion to principles of liberty, equality, and equal opportunity for all citizens." In addition, there was the fear that the entire episode would undermine America's moral authority in the world of color.

The fear of the damage done by the Little Rock episode was generally assuaged by the decision to send troops to enforce the orders of the federal courts. In Belgium, the "despatch of federal troops was warmly applauded and interpreted as a clear demonstration of American determination to enforce the law."
 In Amsterdam, one newspaper saw the president's decision to send the troops to Little Rock as analogous to the decision to send troops to Europe during the Second World War -it was a commitment to the protection of human rights.
 According to the Luxembourg Tageblatt, Eisenhower's decision to send troops "saves not only a principle but the soul of a country which, if it had permitted the situation in Little Rock to continue, could no longer have laid claim to being the leader of the free bloc."

The response in Africa provided a very revealing insight into the current state of opinion in the European colonial possessions. In Nigeria, the West African Pilot raised the question: "What moral right have Americans to condemn apartheid in South Africa when still maintaining it by law?" and concluded that Little Rock "has shown that the US has no moral claim to be leader of Western democracies; that one can't be world champion of the colonial peoples while championing inequality in one's backyard."
 Vice President Nixon had certainly captured African sentiment in his report to the president. In Dakar, the American consul general reported that the French and African reactions to Little Rock differed substantially. The French reaction, he reported, was a sense of self-congratulation and moral superiority since "we do things better here and in France." He reported that many of his French friends, who in previous months had been complaining about sending their children to schools with African pupils, "suddenly, became rather proud of the fact. Numerous French officials hinted, always politely, that perhaps Little Rock would make the United States a little more sympathetic to France's problem in Algeria, and especially at the coming U.N. Session."
 The local population, however, was apparently impressed with Eisenhower's firm stance during the crisis, and the use of troops was seen as a reflection of the president's resolve.
 As a consequence the consul general saw the president's handling of the matter as having substantially improved the American image in Africa.
In South Africa, there was a similar development where sentiment differed among whites and blacks. The consul general in Johannesburg reported that blacks were generally shocked by the incident but had grown to appreciate that the events triggering the crisis were "counter to general public opinion in the United States and to U.S. national policy." On the other hand, the whites seemed to feel that their own apartheid policies had been vindicated by the crisis in Little Rock.
 In Mozambique, the consulate reported that Little Rock had become a symbol of black-white relations in the United States and that . Christensen despatch to the Department of State,  September , RG , . /-. . Hunt despatch to the Department of State,  October , RG , . /-. . Mallory-Browne despatch to the Department of State,  October , RG , . /-.
. Ibid. The consul general went on to report that the Little Rock crisis had been widely discussed and had become known to villages deep in the interior. He reported the view of a leading Senegalese politician that the president's action in dispatching troops to Little Rock had had an enormous impact upon Africans: "M. Doudou Gueye said that at Bamako, where several thousand Africans were gathered from all parts of the area, Little Rock was a topic of intense discussion, and the consensus had been that the President would not dare use federal troops to enforce de-segregation. When he did so, Africans were deeply impressed."
. Beach despatch to the Department of State,  December , RG , . /-.
American "moral standing has been considerably damaged and in [the] Portuguese view here any pretension of an American to advise any European Government on African affairs at this point would be hypocrisy."

In Indonesia, the pro-government newspaper Suluh Indonesia published an open letter to the American ambassador and the American community in Jakarta that was remarkable for its spirited criticism of the events in Little Rock. The newspaper pointed to the contradiction of Americans championing democracy abroad even as domestic race relations raised serious questions about the American commitment to democracy at home. The newspaper further suggested that the citizens of Arkansas and other Southern states should pay a visit to Indonesia to learn about tolerance.
 On a much more practical level, the Little Rock situation was also problematic for American diplomacy at the United Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge, after applauding the president for his decision to send troops, reported that "at the United Nations I can see clearly the harm that the riots in Little Rock are doing to our foreign relations. More than two-thirds of the world is non-white and the reactions of the representatives of these people is easy to see. I suspect that we lost several votes on the Chinese communist item because of Little Rock."

On the positive side, Lodge reported that Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, during the course of a visit to Japan, had praised Eisenhower's actions in sending troops to Little Rock. Lodge opined, "That goes a long way."  Thus, the Little Rock crisis opened a window through which the international politics of race became inextricably linked with American domestic politics. The gap between the American championship of democracy abroad and the reality of violent resistance to racial and political equality at home had been laid bare for the entire world to examine and pass judgment. In the wake of the Little Rock crisis, the United States discovered that it needed to devise a solution to the issues of racial inequality and the politics of exclusion at home in a way that would make its championship of democracy and anti-colonialism abroad a credible foreign policy. The decision to use the troops in Little Rock had clearly signaled a level of commitment by the federal government to the idea of desegregation. In a sense, American efforts to assert a leadership role in the non-European world had become hinged to the idea that its domestic race relations would be an index of its "fitness" to claim such leadership. It was a context that would fuel the ongoing struggle for equality in the United States and the rise of a civil rights movement that was aware of the capacity of international scrutiny to influence the course of American politics. One of the immediate consequences of the Little Rock crisis for American foreign policy was the preparation within the State Department of a paper on "Talking Points to Overcome Adverse Reaction to Little Rock Incident." The information compiled was then circulated to all field missions and the United States Mission at the United Nations for their guidance.
 In a cover instruction from the Department of State to the chiefs of mission or principal officers, Acting Secretary Christian Herter stated "The Department realizes further that remedial action will be a long range operation and that the damage that has been done the United States by sensational newspaper accounts and photographs cannot be repaired overnight." He asked recipients to give serious thought to the steps needed "to start the long and slow job of putting these unfortunate incidents in their proper perspective."
 As the document made clear, the State Department was concerned to ensure that international views of Little Rock should be seen as an aberrant episode in the ongoing process of racial reform. It emphasized that in the majority of American states, the process of school desegregation was not as contentious as the Little Rock crisis may have suggested. It also argued that the increasing employment of blacks in the federal government, the desegregation of the military, and the growth in home ownership and rising income levels among non-whites in the United States all indicated the quiet improvement in the lives of black Americans. The document then went on to explain that the problems arising from its efforts to lower discriminatory barriers were not singular to the United States, and that the commitment to freedom and equality for individuals had been affirmed by the crisis itself. The final paragraph was a revealing glimpse into the concerns of the authors of the document: "In the United States, national authority is being used not to suppress individual equality and freedom but to uphold them. In the Little Rock incident national authority has been invoked to maintain [the] equal rights of a minority. In the Soviet Union national authority has been repeatedly invoked to suppress the rights of minorities."
 It was evident that there was a perceived need to avoid any parallels being drawn between the policies of the Soviet Union and those pursued by the United States.
The Eisenhower administration had become increasingly concerned about the exploitation of its domestic racial problems by the Communist states. In the wake of the Little Rock crisis, Eisenhower asked Henry Cabot Lodge for "suggestions to repair the damage done to our world position by the events at Little Rock."
 Lodge suggested that U.S. diplomatic representatives should make a sustained effort to offer hospitality to distinguished colored people across the board and not only in the non-European world. Further, he recommended that the United States extend a loan to India, given India's importance among the new nations in the international system. He also reiterated his position that the United States should support a major UN program for multilateral economic aid to the Third World and welcomed recent signs that the State Department was coming to support such a program. He indicated that "The prestige which the Soviet Union is getting because of its satellites intensifies the importance of effective non-communist technical and economic assistance coming in a way which does not look like the US-USSR power struggle."
 Thus, Little Rock had become a catalyst for the reassessment by the administration of its terms of engagement with the Third World and the increasing competition with the Communist powers for influence in the nonEuropean world.
This concern with the implications of American race relations for American relations in the non-European world was of immediate concern during the Little Rock crisis. The finance minister of Ghana, K. A. Gbedemah, visited the United States in September-October  -in the midst of the Little Rock crisis. Gbedemah had gone to the United States for meetings at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and to lead the Ghanaian delegation to the United Nations. He had also scheduled meetings with American officials to discuss American assistance to Ghana. On the way to Maryland Sate College to deliver an address, in the company of three black American students, one of whom had lived and operated a school in Ghana, Gbedemah was refused sit-down service at a restaurant in Dover, Delaware. When the story was revealed in the press, Eisenhower invited Gbedemah to the White House for breakfast with himself and Vice President Nixon. The American ambassador in Ghana also made a public statement deploring the incident.  Eisenhower's gesture helped to defuse the situation, but the entire incident symbolized the linkage between American race relations and foreign policy. The foreign policy implications of the incident were of considerable importance since the United States had been attempting to forestall the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ghana and the major Communist states, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
 The incident had also occurred after Nixon's visit to Africa, including his participation in the independence celebrations in Ghana, out of which had come his suggestion that American foreign and domestic policies had to be consistent on the issue of race. For the administration, the year  served as a watershed. Little Rock had forced a departure from the studied indifference to foreign perceptions of American race relations that had shaped the administration's response to the Autherine Lucy case in Alabama.
The transition from colonial rule had begun in Africa, and the administration was clearly sensitive to its implications for both domestic politics and foreign policy. In May , the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Clarence Randall, presented an oral report of his trip to Africa in March . There is extensive documentation on the U.S. effort to disrupt Soviet and Chinese efforts to establish relations with Ghana and Liberia in FRUS, -  :-.
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and April at a meeting of the National Security Council. Eisenhower commended Randall's written report to the members of the NSC and described it as "interesting, intriguing, and valuable." Randall described his visit to Africa as "a very stirring adventure" and emphasized that economic and political concerns should outweigh military considerations in shaping American policy toward the sub-Saharan region. He argued that the rise of nationalism was sweeping Central Africa and that the demand for political independence was somewhat "terrifying, as one deduced from reading the biography of Nkrumah."
 After a discussion of the records of the various colonial powers in the continent, Randall pointed to the dilemma that had become increasingly tortuous for American foreign policy -the United States was caught between its professions of support for an end to colonialism and the demand by its European partners that it refrain from providing assistance to their African colonies.
 Even as he emphasized the growing importance of the African nationalist challenge to European colonial rule, Randall, in response to the prompting of General Robert Cutler, acknowledged that the situation in Liberia was of some concern. He prefaced his remarks on Liberia with the admonition that: "this was a very sensitive situation, discussion of which should be kept within the walls of this room."
 He reported that American companies in Liberia were practicing segregation and had not treated African workers well. As a consequence, the Liberian government had passed an anti-segregation law as an indication of its discontent with the policies of the American companies that Morrow termed "undemocratic and almost uncivilized."
 Unlike Suez, Liberia made it difficult for the American government to assume the high ground in an effort to distance the United States from its colonial partners. In fact, the situation in Liberia reflected the successful export of American ideas . Memorandum of discussion at the th meeting of the National Security Council,  May , FRUS, - :-. According to Randall, "The metropoles do not want the United States to provide any assistance to their African colonies. On the other hand, the newly independent states insist on knowing where the United States stands on the problem of colonialism. So we are caught on the horns of the dilemma of NATO on the one hand and of a free, non-Communist Africa on the other. Mr. Randall felt the time was approaching when we would have to take a firm stand against colonialism."
. Ibid. With further prompting from General Cutler, Randall revealed that the issue of discrimination in Liberia also encompassed relations among the descendants of the former American slaves who had settled in that country and who discriminated against the indigenous groups there.
. Morrow, Black Man in the White House, .
on race that had defined American life since the late nineteenth century. Randall's concerns about the wider dissemination of the information in his briefing was indicative of the sense of siege that was overtaking the administration on the issue of race as a liability for American foreign policy. The predicament that the American record on race posed for foreign policy was subsequently confirmed by a memorandum, "Treatment of Minorities in the United States -Impact on Our Foreign Relations," prepared by the Civil Rights Commission at the request of the White House. In its summary review, the memorandum acknowledged that racial discrimination had undermined the moral authority of the United States and provided ammunition for the anti-American propaganda disseminated by the Communist states. The memorandum also argued that the "adoption by the Accra Conference of Independent African States in April  of a resolution condemning racial discrimination and segregation is typical of the continuing concern with this question of the nations of Africa and Asia."
 The questioning of the moral authority of the American government also came from white-controlled governments in Africa since American racial policies seemed to offer no substantial improvement upon their own records.
One example of the latter sentiment was reported by the American consul in Salisbury who cited a feature article in the Rhodesia Herald of  September . The special correspondent who authored the article provided a favorable assessment of Rhodesia's handling of racial problems as compared with the United States and claimed that a Negro would receive a fairer trial in Rhodesia than in any state in the American South.
 It was an indication of the American record on race in the late s that white colonists in Southern Rhodesia could lay claim to a more impartial judicial system. The special correspondent for the Rhodesia Herald had touched upon a very sensitive nerve -the treatment of blacks by the judicial system in the South. In August , an Alabama court sentenced Jimmy Wilson, a black man, to death for stealing $. from a white woman. The death sentence created adverse reaction to the American justice system. In a telegram to Governor James Folsom of Alabama, Dulles indicated that the Department of State and its missions abroad had received considerable correspondence protesting the death sentence. In addition to  letters and telegrams, the embassy in London had received a petition for clemency signed by , people. In Africa, "Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah has inquired urgently as to the facts in the case and our embassy in Liberia has reported that the execution of Wilson would greatly damage the position of the United States in all of West Africa."
 Dulles abjured any effort to influence the case or the governor's handling of the matter. Folsom reported, however, that he was to support the resolution and asking the United States to join Britain in abstaining on the vote, Eisenhower reversed himself and instructed the State Department to abstain. In addition, he requested the State Department to approach certain African delegations at the UN with a view to persuading them to abstain on the resolution.
 That request was a measure of Eisenhower's hubris on the issue of colonialism.
It was a decision that was not easily accepted by the American delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. American Ambassador James Wadsworth at the United Nations stated for the record and personally to Herter that he was "shocked and disheartened" bythe decision to abstain.
 Wadsworth believed that since the United States had already informed its Asian allies, the Philippines and Japan, of its decision to back the resolution, any change would be interpreted as evidence of American support for its colonial partners.
 A black member of the American delegation to the United Nations, the sociologist and opera singer Zelma Watson George, stood and applauded the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly and later said that she was of the view that "no one in the delegation supported the abstention." Her action caused a stir among the delegates but she indicated that she felt an obligation to show her opposition to the American abstention and was glad that she had acted in accord with her feelings.
 The willingness of the American representatives at the UN to signal their disapproval of the decision taken by Eisenhower revealed the gap between the president and others involved in shaping American foreign policy. Eisenhower's hubris appeared to flow from his failure to acknowledge that American aspirations for leadership in the international arena required the ability to fashion effective coalitions with other states. On the issues of South Africa and colonialism, Eisenhower betrayed his lack of contact with the shifting climate of international and domestic opinion.  . Editorial note, ibid. :-. . Mission at the United Nations tel. to the Department of State,  December , ibid., . The final vote was  to , with the United States joining Australia, Belgium, Britain, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa in abstaining. Only the Dominican Republic was not a colonial power and it was the only Latin American state that did not support the resolution.
. Ibid. Wadsworth emphasized that: "It is also particularly unfortunate this last minute reversal was made after Department informed Tokyo and Manila we would support this resolution; it seems inescapable that word will spread that our vote on this issue, of critical importance to Asians and Africans, was determined by wishes of colonial powers which even we recognize as such."
. The New York Times,  December . The newspaper reported that "Mrs. George's action reminded delegates of a similar move made two years ago by Marian Anderson, another noted Negro, while serving with the United States delegation. After voting against a motion to call a special session of the Assembly to study the Cameroons, Miss Anderson made it clear that she was "a member of an instructed delegation, and we are here to carry out what is wanted."
. The irony of Eisenhower's instruction for the United States to abstain on the vote was that it followed upon an apology issued by Eisenhower himself to Michel Gallin-Douathe, the Central African Republic representative to the UN, for an incident in Baltimore where he was refused service in a restaurant. Gallin-Douathe had gone to Washington to present his credentials to
The divergences within the administration over the Sharpeville crisis and the UN resolution on colonialism underscored the state of flux that had overcome American policy.
 Prior to the Little Rock episode, the Eisenhower administration had assumed that it could afford to ignore international critiques of American race relations and even help South Africa to insulate itself from international condemnation of its apartheid policies. The sanguine dismissal of international opinion proved to be of limited duration, as the Little Rock crisis shattered the notion that America was immune to criticism. Debates Eisenhower and was on his way back to New York when the incident occurred. The United States Mission to the United Nations recommended that there should be an apology from the president. It reported that the story was circulating among the representatives of the African countries, and that the Guineans and Ghanaians were "making [a] special point in conversations with African colleagues of citing this case as proof [that] America is a nation of racists." The mission saw the presidential apology as a way of defusing the potential problems for American relations with the African states raised by the incident. Eisenhower sent an apology deploring the incident and assuring Gallin-Douathe that the United States would continue its efforts to eliminate the causes of such incidents. The letter concluded: "The United States attaches great importance to the friendship of the African people. I hope you will judge this regrettable incident, which reflects the attitude of only a minority of the citizens of this country, in its proper perspective." Editorial note, which contains excerpts of the documents pertaining to the issue, FRUS, - :-. within the administration about race and colonialism after Little Rock reflected a sense of siege in dealing with the manifest volatility of the challenge to the notion of white/European supremacy. There was a growing realization that America was as much part of the problem as its European partners and that its leadership role would be seriously compromised if it did not become part of the solution. Unfortunately, the Eisenhower administration proved to be unable to mount the necessary effort to devise a legitimate solution to the problems of race within the United States and internationally. The ambivalence that Eisenhower betrayed on issues of race in foreign policy paralleled his handling of the Little Rock crisis -he was profoundly uneasy about acknowledging the legitimacy of claims of people of color when faced by intransigent whites.

Even as he was willing to make an effort to redress wrongs inflicted upon individual African diplomatic representatives by Americans, he seemed unable to understand the broader challenge to colonialism and apartheid by people of color. His role in shaping the American response to these issues revealed the extent to which his personal influence helped to define American foreign policy. Nonetheless, international scrutiny and criticism of American society had created a climate in which Eisenhower appeared increasingly to be an anachronism.
 The changed international context opened the way for the emergence of the Kennedy administration with its promise of a new beginning in American policy toward European colonialism and the domestic politics of race.
. A vivid example of this tendency was exemplified by Eisenhower's resistance to appeals to intervene, even if symbolically, in the situation in New Orleans in November  where white protesters had mounted a vigorous campaign against the desegregation of the schools. Ward Melville, who had served as a trustee of Columbia University when Eisenhower was president of that institution, sent a note to the president in November  suggesting that Eisenhower should speak out on "this New Orleans integration matter." He attached a letter to the editor of the New York Times that argued "how fitting it would be for the President, by deed or word, to pay tribute to these Negro kids, their parents, friends and counterparts who unquestionably represent the highest expression of the spirit, the courage, the moral dedication that have taken America so far. As a lame-duck President there are no votes to win or lose; there is no one to impugn his motive. All that is necessary is the belief and the desire." Ward Melville to Eisenhower,  November , Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A--A, box . Eisenhower sent a non-committal response that "any statement or action respecting this delicate situation must be very carefully weighed both as to content and timing. I appreciate your feeling and, of course, will stay in continuous close touch with the developing situation." Eisenhower to Melville,  November , Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A--A, box . A similar appeal from Senator Jacob Javits of New York received an equally non-committal response. Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, OF -A--A, box .
. As Robert MacMahon has argued, it is not possible to provide a thorough evaluation of Eisenhower as a president without assessing his policy toward the rise of non-European nationalism. I would only add that non-European nationalism and civil rights are two sides of the same coin when such an assessment is contemplated. See Robert J. MacMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly , no.  (): -.
